Enforcing compliance with international environmental agreements using a deposit-refund system
In: International environmental agreements: politics, law and economics, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 481-496
ISSN: 1573-1553
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In: International environmental agreements: politics, law and economics, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 481-496
ISSN: 1573-1553
In: Public choice, Band 142, Heft 1-2, S. 9-23
ISSN: 1573-7101
Most coalitions that form to increase contributions to a public good do not require full participation by all users of the public good, and therefore create incentives for free riding. If given the opportunity to opt out of a voluntary coalition, in theory, agents should try to be among the first to do so, forcing the remaining undecided agents to bear the cost of participating in the coalition. This study tests the predicted sequence of participation decisions in voluntary coalitions using real-time threshold public goods experiments. We find that subjects' behavior is more consistent with the theoretical predictions when the difference in payoffs between coalition members and free-riding non-members is relatively large. Adapted from the source document.
In: Public choice, Band 142, Heft 1-2, S. 9-23
ISSN: 1573-7101
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Working paper
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In: Palgrave Communications, Band 2
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In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 63-77
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 47, Heft 1, S. 45-63
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 42, Heft 4, S. 491-508
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 13686
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Working paper
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 81, Heft 4, S. 685-710
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: Routledge advances in climate change research
World Affairs Online
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 14536
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In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 62, Heft 4, S. 729-744
ISSN: 1573-1502